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We consider an R&D-driven endogenous growth model in which innovation is risky and 
agents are risk averse. Growth is determined by the occupational choice of agents who can 
either work in production for a wage or become entrepreneurs. In this context, we examine the 
impact of redistributive taxation and compute socially optimal tax rates. Redistribution acts as 
social insurance, thus encouraging innovation and accelerating growth. The general 
equilibrium effects of the reallocation of labour induced by taxation can offset the direct 
distributive impact of taxes and result in a Pareto improvement. Optimal tax rates are a hump-
shaped function of the intertemporal spillover effect. 
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The revival of interest in the relationship between inequality and growth has
led economists to raise new questions about the eﬀects of redistribution. The
traditional incentive argument that redistribution reduces physical capital ac-
cumulation has been emphasised by models such as those of Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994). However, such results are reversed
once there are capital market imperfections. Redistribution can then become
growth enhancing either through an ‘opportunity creation eﬀect,’ as in Galor
and Zeira (1993), or through an ‘incentive mechanism’ in the presence of moral
hazard, in Aghion and Bolton (1997). A possible reading of this literature is that
redistribution fosters growth only in developing countries, where credit markets
are highly imperfect and growth is driven by factor accumulation. Meanwhile, in
industrial economies, which have well-functioning ﬁnancial institutions, demo-
cratic political systems, and active R&D sectors, redistribution is likely to slow
down growth. In this paper we argue that industrial economies are characterised
by a diﬀerent type of market imperfection, namely the absence of private insur-
ance for risk-taking entrepreneurs, and we examine the eﬀect of redistribution
on occupational choice when innovation is uncertain and agents risk-averse.
There is plenty of evidence on the sizeable risks faced by entrepreneurs.
There were on average 78,711 business failures per year in the United States
from 1990 to 1997; 61.5 per cent of businesses exit within ﬁve years, and the
founder of a private company faces a risk of about 10 per cent of losing all his/her
investment in the ﬁrst ten years (Dun and Bradstreet Corporation; Dunne et
al., 1988; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; respectively). The cross-
sectional standard deviation of self-employment earnings is substantially higher
than wages from paid employment (Hamilton, 2000). At the same time, a
number of authors have established the importance of taxation in encouraging or
discouraging self-employment and entrepreneurship. For example, Bird (2001)
examines cross-country diﬀerences in the Welfare State and ﬁnds that greater
social spending encourages risk-taking.1
This evidence contrasts with the standard approach in the growth literature,
where, despite major steps to provide microfoundations for the innovation pro-
cess, risk-aversion and insurance have not received much attention. We develop
a discrete-time, overlapping generations, variant of the Schumpterian growth
model of Aghion and Howitt (1992), in which agents are risk-averse. There
are two sources of inequality–that between skilled and unskilled agents which
are ex ante diﬀerent, and that among skilled agents who choose diﬀerent oc-
cupations and become diﬀerent ex post. In particular, some skilled workers
will choose to work in production for ﬁxed wages, while others will become en-
trepreneurs/researchers and receive random proﬁts. It is this endogenous choice
of occupation which drives the growth process. Using this framework, we ad-
dress two questions. Since redistribution provides insurance for entrepreneurs,
how does redistribution aﬀect growth? Since innovations create intertemporal
1See also Stabile (2004), Bruce (2000), and Gentry and Hubbard (2000).
1spillovers, how do growth considerations aﬀect optimal tax rates?
Several broad results emerge from our analysis. First, we show that the
net eﬀect of introducing a small amount of redistributive taxation is to in-
sure researchers in the case of failure, hence increasing the attractiveness of
entrepreneurship. This raises the amount of research undertaken and acceler-
ates the growth rate, relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Second, we consider the general equilibrium eﬀects of taxes. When the
number of researchers increases, the number of skilled wage-earners falls, raising
their equilibrium wage. This implies that skilled workers may experience an
increase in their net incomes despite being net ﬁscal contributors. At the same
time, a reduction in the number of skilled wage-earners reduces the marginal
productivity and the wage of unskilled workers, although they beneﬁt directly
from ﬁscal transfers. It turns out that the overall eﬀect of redistribution can be
(but need not be) simultaneously growth-enhancing and Pareto-improving.
Third, we use numerical examples to examine how optimal linear tax rates
vary with key parameters, such as the degree of intertemporal knowledge spillovers.
We ﬁnd that in the absence of growth, that is, when entrepreneurship is a purely
rent-seeking activity, optimal tax rates are substantially lower than when en-
trepreneurship generates technological change. This indicates that the social
planner can use redistribution both to reduce inequality and to foster innova-
tion. We also show that the optimal tax rate is a hump-shaped function of the
spillover factor. The reason for this is that the Schumpeterian model implies
that there is a social cost of innovation due to the monopoly exercised by the
successful innovator. For weak intertemporal spillovers, the optimal tax rate is
driven by static equity considerations, but when spillovers are large the loss due
to monopoly becomes important. The planner then wants to slow the rate of
innovation, and hence reduces the amount of redistribution.2
Our paper bridges two strands of literature: one concerns the impact of re-
distribution on growth, the other the eﬀect of social insurance on occupational
choice. The idea that redistribution can act as social insurance when private
risk-pooling arrangements are absent was ﬁrst noted by Eaton and Rosen (1980)
and Varian (1980). Further studies by Kanbur (1981), Peck (1989), and Boad-
way, Marchand and Pestieau (1991) examined how redistribution aﬀects the
occupational choice between risky entrepreneurship and paid employment. A
central concern in these papers is the implication of occupational choice for op-
timal taxation. The models used, however, are static as entry into entrepreneur-
ship is assumed to have no impact on innovation or growth. As a result the social
planner faces a tradeoﬀ since greater redistribution reduces (ex post) inequality,
but, because it provides more insurance against business failures, it encourages
excessive risk taking (i.e. leads to too many entrepreneurs). The introduction
2This eﬀect is equivalent to, though not the same as, the ‘business stealing’ eﬀect in Aghion
and Howitt (1992). In their model, inﬁnite patent lives imply that the social cost of innovation
is the transfer of proﬁts from one monopolist to another. In our model, ﬁnite patent lives
will imply that there is competitive production when patents expire with no new innovations
occurring. Both eﬀe c t sp l a yt h es a m er o l e ,t e n d i n gt om a k et h el a i s s e z - f a i r eg r o w t hr a t e
excessive.
2of a dynamic aspect to entrepreneurship implies, on the other hand, that the
provision of insurance may be desirable from the planner’s point of view.
Two papers are particularly close to our work. Caucutt et al. (2003) ex-
amine the impact of tax progressivity on growth, when individuals invest in
human capital, and ﬁnd that greater progressivity can accelerate growth. Their
work diﬀers from our’s in that they consider the risk associated with educa-
tional investments, and how progressivity may reduce this risk. However, some
authors have argued that remaining unskilled actually entails a greater risk due
to the greater probability of being unemployed, and that education is precisely
a way to reduce this risk.3 Chou and Talmain (1996) examine an R&D model
in which redistribution can be both growth-enhancing and Pareto improving.
Their mechanism relies on the elasticity of individual labor supplies. Redistri-
bution impacts growth because an individual’s wealth aﬀects her consumption-
leisure tradeoﬀ and hence determines her labor supply. Under certain conditions,
redistribution may raise the aggregate labor supply and hence the growth rate.
Furthermore, since agents are inﬁnitely lived, faster growth oﬀsets the static
loss imposed by redistribution on rich individuals, and a Pareto improvement
may be possible. Our analysis diﬀers from this approach in two crucial aspects.
First, allowing for risk-aversion implies that redistribution aﬀects innovation
through occupational choice rather than through a ‘scale eﬀect.’ Second, the
Pareto improvement obtained by Chou and Talmain is due to the growth-eﬀect
oﬀsetting the direct redistribution eﬀect, and would not necessarily hold if in-
dividuals had ﬁnite lives. We focus on an overlapping generations setup and
consider the eﬀect of redistribution on the welfare of a particular generation.
This means that we do no need to consider the weight give by the planner to
successive generations.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 describes the equilibrium
of the model. Section 4 considers analytically the eﬀect of introducing a small
amount of redistribution. The intertemporal social welfare function is derived
and discussed in section 5. Section 6 contains numerical simulations of the opti-
mal tax rates to show the policy implications of the model. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Population
A population of size N consists of L unskilled and H skilled workers, each living
for two periods. There are overlapping generations with constant regeneration
of the population, so that in each period half the population is young and half is
old. Unskilled workers are always employed in manufacturing. Skilled workers
make an occupational choice at the beginning of their lives, choosing between
being an entrepreneur or a manufacturing worker.
Entrepreneurs (also called ‘researchers’) undertake research in order to invent
a higher quality intermediate good and obtain a patent for it next period. The
3Gould, Moav, and Weinberg (2001).
3mass of entrepreneurs in period t is denoted Rt.T h er e m a i n i n gMt = H − Rt
skilled workers, whom we denote as ‘producers,’ are hired for ﬁxed wages to
manufacture the intermediate good using the incumbent technology.
The production of ﬁnal goods uses the most recently invented type of inter-
mediate good and unskilled labor as inputs. It is assumed that skilled workers
can always choose to perform unskilled work, so they can never be worse oﬀ
than the unskilled.
2.2 Production Technologies
A single homogeneous ﬁnal good is produced by a competitive sector according
to the production function
Yt = Atxθ
tL1−θ, (1)
where At is a parameter indicating total factor productivity, which depends on
the ‘quality’ of the intermediate good used, and xt is the amount of intermediate
good employed. The price of the ﬁnal good is the numeraire.
The intermediate good is produced using skilled labor alone according to the
linear technology
xt = Mt. (2)
The intermediate good sector may be monopolistic or competitive depending
on whether or not the highest quality of the intermediate good is under patent.
Each innovation increases the value of At by a factor γ > 1, with At+1 = γAt
if an innovation occurs in t and At+1 = At if no innovation occurs. We assume
that innovations are drastic, so that only the latest quality of the good will be
produced at each point in time.4
Similar to the assumptions in Cooper et al. (2001), the probability of at
least one entrepreneur discovering the ‘next’ quality of intermediate good during
period t is
Pr(at least one innovator) = λR
η
t
where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, implying that the technology of discovery features duplica-
tion in research (a form of decreasing returns to scale).5 At most one patent
is awarded each period. We assume that, conditional on an innovation oc-
curring, the probability that the patent is awarded or not awarded to a given
entrepreneur is, respectively,
Pr(patent to a given entrepreneur|an innovation occurs) = 1/Rt
Pr(no patent to a given entrepreneur|an innovation occurs) = (Rt − 1)/Rt.
4Assuming non-drastic innovations would leave unchanged our qualitative results.
5Another possibility is that there is a spillover of knowledge among researchers in the
current period, implying η > 1. However, we do not explore it here.
4We require Rt ≥ 1 for the probability distribution to be deﬁned.6
A patent is assumed to last for a single period, which is the period follow-
ing the discovery. After that period, anyone can freely copy the technology.
Lastly, there is no storage (nor external lending/borrowing) in this economy; all
production is consumed in the current period.
2.3 Market Structure, Proﬁts and Wages
The ﬁnal goods sector is competitive. However, the market structure for inter-
mediate goods depends on whether or not an innovation occurred the previous
period. The intermediate good is produced by a patent-protected monopolist
in period t i fa n do n l yi fa ni n n o v a t i o no c c u r r e da tt − 1. If there were no
innovation at t−1, then at t there are no intermediaries under patent and there
is competition in the sector.7
Let φt ∈ {0,1} denote the market structure in period t, with φt = 1 indicat-
ing monopoly, φt = 0 competition. Wage rates and aggregate labor supplies will
depend on the market structure and are therefore indexed by φt. For conve-
nience, we shall drop the period t time subscript on φ.L e tw
φ
t denote the wage
of skilled labor used to produce the intermediate good; thus w1
t is the wage rate
if in period t the intermediate goods market is a monopoly, and w0
t is the wage
rate when there is competition. Similarly, v
φ





t are the allocations of skilled labor to manufacturing and entrepreneur-
ship, while Y
φ
t is output. All unskilled labor L is employed in production in
both states and paid its marginal product.
2.3.1 Monopoly
We ﬁrst consider the case where there is a monopolist in the intermediate goods
sector in period t; φ =1 . D i ﬀerentiating (1) to obtain the inverse demand













This expression, together with the market-clearing condition for skilled workers,
xt = M1
t , gives the skilled wage w1
t, the unskilled wage v1
t, and the monopolist’s
6If Rt < 1, then the conditional probabilities above are assumed to be truncated at 1 and
0, respectively. We shall focus on interior solutions.
7There is some similarity between our setup and the model of Lambson and Phillips (2004),
where they assume that monopoly prevails if there is a sole innovator in the period, while















Πt =( 1 − θ)θY 1
t . (6)
2.3.2 Competition
Suppose there is no innovation in period t − 1. Any previous patent has now
expired and there is competition in the intermediate goods sector at t.T h e
price of intermediate goods must then equal their marginal cost, which is just
the producer’s wage, w0
t, and zero proﬁts are earned in the intermediate goods














Two things are worth noting. First, from the wage equations (4), (5), (7),







1+φ.As u ﬃcient condition,
therefore, for ensuring that skilled workers always receive higher wages than
unskilled workers is L/H > (1 − θ)/θ
2. The relative abundance of unskilled
labor is one source of income inequality in this economy, the other being the
risk associated with the research process, as we will see below. Second, the
level of output in periods in which there is monopoly will diﬀer from that in
periods where there is competition. In general, output will be greater when
there is competition. More research will usually be undertaken under monopoly,
implying that the number of producers is also higher under competition.
2.4 Taxation
We are interested in the optimal linear tax system, i.e. in a system having the
general form of T(I)=−B + τI,w h e r eI is individual income, τ the tax rate,
and B a demogrant. The tax and transfer policy we study has two important
features. First, an individual is paid a transfer B in the ﬁrst period of her
life. However, she will pay taxes when young if she is unskilled or a producer,
and when old if she is an entrepreneur, as will be clear below. Second, since
there are two states of the world, we allow the government to tax diﬀerently
in those two states. The two taxes have diﬀerent eﬀects on the allocation of
labor, and there is no reason why they should be set at the same level. In the
numerical simulations in section 6 we also consider cases where the tax rates
are constrained to be identical.
6The government holds a balanced budget in each period, so that its budget
constraints are
N · B1


















Note that the tax system considers individual uncertainty but ignores aggre-
gate uncertainty, as no resources are transferred between periods with diﬀerent
output levels.
2.5 Utility
Skilled workers make an occupational choice between working in manufactur-
ing (m) or entrepreneurship (e). All individuals supply one unit of work eﬀort
when they are young. When they are old they do not work. Wages are paid
to producers in the period that they work (therefore, when they are young). A
successful entrepreneur that innovates at t obtains a patent for the intermediate
good, and hires a new generation of young workers to manufacture the innova-
tion at t+1. Entrepreneurs hence receive income and pay taxes only when they
are old.
Individuals have identical utility functions and it is assumed that consump-
tion, C, when young or old are perfect substitutes. The utility of someone born
in period t is assumed to be given by
Ut(Ct,C t+1)=( Ct + Ct+1)
α , 0 < α < 1.
Given the assumptions made above regarding the timing of earnings, it is
necessarily the case that individuals always work when they are young, but
the period in which they consume depends on whether they are manufacturing
workers or entrepreneurs.
























where λ(Rφ)η−1 is the unconditional probability of winning the patent race and
the term Cπt+1 is the consumption in period t +1o fape r i od - t patent winner,
C
φ













7Now suppose that a skilled individual chooses to become a producer, rather






























































At the start of her life a skilled worker makes her occupational choice in order to
maximize expected utility, given the market structure for intermediate goods.
Arbitrage will then determine the equilibrium allocation of skilled individuals
across occupations in each state, R
φ


































where the utilities are given by (11)—(13).
3.2 Steady State Equilibrium
Note from (15) and (16) that the occupational choice at period t depends im-
plicitly on expectations about future research. We assume perfect forecasting,
and focus on the steady state equilibrium where, given the policy variables τ1
and τ0,w eh a v eMφ = M
φ
t and Rφ = R
φ
t for all t.8
Using (11)—(13) in (15) and (16) the steady state equal-utilities conditions


























8See Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998) for a discussion of the role of expectations. Our


































where the left-hand side in each of (17) and (18) is the utility of a producer
and the right-hand side is an entrepreneur’s expected utility. Of course, the
common term (Y
φ
t )α in each equation can be cancelled out. (17) and (18)
together determine the equilibrium values of R1 and R0 as a function of the two
tax rates and model parameters.9
3.3 The Laissez-faire Equilibrium
To illustrate the equilibrium, we consider the benchmark case of the economy
without intervention. In this case, there is no insurance, hence the entrepreneurs
who fail to discover a new quality receive no income. Since η ≤ 1, the interior
equilibrium for the number of researchers in the monopoly state is unique and










assuming that R1 is greater than one, i.e; if γλ
1/α is large enough.
When the intermediate goods market is competitive, the laissez-faire equi-









(1 − θ)(H − R1)
θ, (20)
with the value of R1 from (19). Equations (19) and (20), together with the fact
that θ < 1, imply that R0 <R 1. In periods in which the intermediate sector is
competitive, there is a greater demand for production workers, their wages are
higher, and the number of producers increases. Consequently, there will be fewer
researchers and a lower probability of innovation. However, output is higher in
the competition state as a larger number of skilled workers are employed in
manufacturing.
9It is easy to see that there is a single solution for R1 in (17). As for R0, after dividing
both sides of (18) by (Y 0)α, the left-hand side of the resulting equation is increasing and
convex in R0 (and asymptotic at R0 = H) but the right-hand side is U-shaped, which means
the ‘curves’ may intersect more than once. In our numerical simulations the solution for R0
were unique.
9The comparative statics are easily established and are analogous to those
in Aghion and Howitt (1992). The only new aspect is the introduction of risk-
aversion. As expected, greater risk-aversion (lower α) decreases entrepreneur-
ship.
Lemma 1 The laissez-faire equilibrium values of R1and R0a r ei n c r e a s i n gi nλ,
γ,a n dα,a n dd e c r e a s i n gi nθ.
3.4 Innovation and Long-Run Growth

















An innovation has two eﬀects: on the one hand it increases output be-
cause of the higher quality of the intermediate good, on the other it reduces
it if the economy moves from the competitive to the monopolistic state. Fur-
thermore, there may be increases in output in periods in which the technology
is unchanged, as the end of the patent life will bring about an increase in the
amount of the intermediate input used. However, the natures of these two eﬀects
are diﬀerent. Technological advances have permanent eﬀects on welfare, while
changes in the amount of intermediate good used are only temporary, and result
in ﬂuctuations along the trend due to one-period changes in the level of manu-
facturing employment. We therefore focus on the expected rate of technological
change, gt, where
gt = E(lnAt+1 − lnAt).
The expected rate of technical change at any future date t depends on the
current state, since the probabilities of innovation in each period follow a state-
dependent Markov chain. In the long run, however, the state-dependent Markov
process converges to an invariant probability distribution, generating a simple
Bernouilli process for innovation (see appendix), in which there is a constant
chance q that an innovation occurs, regardless of the current or ‘initial’ state
φ0,w h e r e
q =
q0
1 − q1 + q0 (22)
and qφ = λ(Rφ)η is the probability of innovation in the current period when the
current state is φ. The expected long-run growth rate, g,i st h e n
g = qlnγ (23)
Clearly, the long-run probability of innovation, and hence the growth rate, are
increasing in the number of researchers in both states. The question we address
in the next section is whether redistribution encourages or discourages economic
growth through the impact of taxation on the probability of innovation.
104 Equilibrium Eﬀects of Redistribution
4.1 Redistribution and Research
Central to our analysis of optimal taxation with occupational choice is the idea
that redistribution can be used to stimulate entrepreneurship and growth. We
address the issue analytically by considering the eﬀect of introducing a small
amount of taxation.
Proposition 1 For an economy in the laissez-faire equilibrium:
1. Introducing a small amount of redistribution in the competition state (τ0 →
0+) increases research in the competition state and does not aﬀe c ti ti n
the monopoly state. The eﬀect is to increase the long-run probability of
innovation q.
2. Introducing a small amount of redistribution in the monopoly state (τ1 →
0+ ) increases research in the monopoly state and reduces it in the com-
petition state. If the skilled population (H) is not too small, the overall
eﬀect is to increase the long-run probability of innovation q.
Proof: See appendix.
From equations (17) and (18), the eﬀect of τ0 is straight-forward. The
tax has no direct impact on R1. It provides an income for unsuccessful en-
trepreneurs, but does not aﬀect the net proﬁtability of an innovation, thus
shifting upwards U0
e. The utility of producers will decrease with τ0 as long as
they are net contributors, shifting U0
m downwards. As a result τ0 unambigu-
ously increases the number of individuals who choose to become researchers in
the competition state and hence raises the long-run probability of innovation.
The eﬀect of τ1 on U1
e represents the ‘social insurance eﬀect’ on entrepreneurs
during the monopoly state. This eﬀect consists ﬁrst of an ‘insurance premium’
which is the net ﬁscal contribution of a successful innovator (which can be as-
sumed positive in any interesting application). The premium captures the tra-
ditional argument that taxes discourage entrepreneurship. Second, unsuccessful
entrepreneurs receive a ‘compensation payment’ that increases their utility and
encourages entrepreneurship. The signiﬁc a n c eo fs o c i a li n s u r a n c ef o ra ne n -
trepreneur is evident in evaluating the partial derivative of her utility at τ1 =0 ,
which is easily seen to be inﬁnite.10 The utility of producers decreases with τ1
as long as they are net contributors.11 As a result, the number of entrepreneurs
in the monopoly state rises. Figure 1 depicts the comparative static eﬀect of
τ1. For any given number of entrepreneurs, a marginal imposition of τ1 shifts
U1
e upwards and U1
m downwards, raising the equilibrium value of R1.
10In reality, many entrepreneurs may have other forms of wealth to consume in the event of
failure, but this merely underscores the point that, in the absence of social insurance, potential
entrepreneurs may delay their entry into business until they have funds to fall back on.
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* * RConsider now the eﬀect of τ1 on the equilibrium for R0.T h et a xt e n d st o
reduce R0 for two reasons. There is a direct tax eﬀect: given output, anticipated
net monopoly proﬁts fall. There is also an indirect eﬀect: the increase in research
in the monopoly state raises anticipated skilled wages and hence lowers the gross
proﬁt of a successful entrepreneur. Consequently the amount of research done
in the competition state falls.
Recall that q increases in both arguments R1 and R0, implying that τ1 has
opposing eﬀects on the long-run probability of innovation. Proposition 1 (part
2) states that the positive eﬀect of R1 on growth will dominate if the number
of skilled workers is suﬃciently large. The reason for this is that a large skilled
labor force ensures that monopoly proﬁts do not fall too much as skilled workers
move away from production in the monopoly state (i.e. as R1 increases), and
hence results in a small reduction in R0.
Two remarks are in order. First, the eﬀect of redistributive taxation on
growth is due to the provision of insurance that encourages risk-taking. It
can easily be checked from equations (17) and (18) that if agents were risk-
neutral (i.e. α = 1), redistribution would have no impact whatsoever on the
occupational choice, and hence would not aﬀect the growth rate. Second, the
eﬀects of large tax rates are ambiguous. In particular, a large τ1 may imply
that the ‘insurance premium’ paid in case of success oﬀsets the utility gain due
to the ‘compensation payment’ received in case of failure, reducing the number
of researchers. This is the standard ar g u m e n tt h a tt a x a t i o no fh i g hi n c o m e s
reduces innovation. Our numerical examples below show, however, that the
insurance eﬀect tends to dominate and that redistribution increases growth,
when tax rates are set optimally.
4.2 Redistribution and Wages
Redistribution also aﬀects social welfare by changing the equilibrium wage rates
and the expected utilities of skilled and unskilled agents. We have the following
results.
Proposition 2 For an economy in the laissez-faire equilibrium:
1. Introducing a small amount of redistribution in the competition state in-
creases (decreases) the wage and utility of skilled (unskilled) workers in the
competition state, and has no eﬀect on wages and utilities in the monopoly
state.
2. Introducing a small amount of redistribution in the monopoly state in-
creases (decreases) the wage and utility of skilled (unskilled) workers in the
monopoly state, and decreases (increases) the wage and utility of skilled
(unskilled) workers in the competition state .
Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that the introduction of a small amount of redistribu-
tion raises the wage rate of each type of worker in one state of the world and
13lowers it in the other state. For tax rates close to zero, the general equilibrium
wage eﬀect dominates the direct eﬀect of income transfers in the utility calcu-
lation. Together, propositions 1 and 2 highlight the impacts of small amounts
of redistribution on the equilibrium number of researchers and on wages and
static utility. These forces play an important role in determining social welfare,
but they are not the full story. As the amount of redistribution is increased
the direct eﬀects of net ﬁscal transfers become relatively more important. Fur-
thermore, the intertemporal spillover eﬀect becomes crucial in calculating the
present value of the stream of social welfare.
5S o c i a l W e l f a r e









t ,w i t hi = e,m,u. The steady state ﬂow of













All the terms in (24) are time-invariant except the technology index At,w h i c h
increases by a factor γ with each innovation. By arbitrage uφ
e = uφ
m,a n d







In order to calculate expected social welfare, we need to consider the branch-
ing process for innovations arising from the state-dependent Markov chain de-
ﬁned by the transition probabilities q0 and q1. Suppose we start at a par-
ticular initial state at time 0, say, φ0 = 1, for which the total utility ﬂow
in period 0 is u1. In period 1, there are two possibilities: with probability
q1 an innovation occurs, in which case (undiscounted) utility is γu1,o rw i t h
probability 1 − q1 no innovation occurs, for which utility is u0. Similarly, in
period 2, there are four possible branches, generating an expected utility ﬂow
of (q1)2γ2u1 + q1(1 − q1)γu0 +( 1− q1)q0γu1 +( 1− q1)(1 − q0)u0.A n ds oo n
for t periods.
An undesirable feature of the above welfare calculation is that period t prob-
abilities of success or failure depend on the speciﬁc initial state. This type of
bias can be eliminated using the steady state probabilities of the Markov process
given by q and 1 − q in (22). In this case, letting δ denote the social discount
r a t e ,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g .
Lemma 2 The discounted expected social welfare over an inﬁnite horizon W is
ﬁnite if δ < 1/γ and is given by



















To better understand the diﬀerent eﬀects of taxation on social welfare, we
derive a second-order Taylor series approximation of W.
Lemma 3 A Taylor series expansion for W around the expected value of s,
E(s)=tq, yields an approximate welfare function of the form
W ≈
¡
qu1 +( 1− q)u0¢
+ δγqq(1 − q)lnγ
h
qu1+(1−q)u0
2(1−δγq) lnγ − (u0 − u1)
i
1 − δγq . (26)
Proof: See appendix.
This expression has an intuitive interpretation. To understand it, recall that
q represents both the probability of being in a monopoly state, as well as the
probability of an innovation, and we should in fact think of these as two un-
related events. The ﬁrst term in the numerator of (26) is simply the expected
static utility, from period 0 onwards, that would prevail if there were no techno-
logical change. The second term captures the gains and losses from innovation,
discounted from period 1 onwards. Every time there is an innovation, the econ-
omy becomes a copy of its previous situation but scaled up by a factor of lnγ;
while q(1 − q) is simply the variance of the innovation process. The term in
square brackets are the beneﬁt minus the cost of innovating: an innovation
increases expected static utility by a factor of lnγ permanently (hence the dis-
count factor in the denominator of the ﬁrst term in square brackets), and has
a cost in terms of lost utility in the period following the innovation (as there is
monopoly rather than competition), captured by (u0 − u1).12
Diﬀerentiating (26) with respect to q we can see that the sign of the derivative
is ambiguous. The beneﬁts of intertemporal spillovers are set against the loss
of (potential) output occurring when the economy moves from a competition
state to a monopoly state, which is similar to the ‘business stealing’ eﬀect that
results in excessive growth in Aghion and Howitt (1992). In both case, it can
be optimal for the social planner to reduce growth.
6O p t i m a l T a x R a t e s
As is clear from the previous section, there a number of eﬀects working in
opposite directions, that make it impossible to obtain analytically the optimal
tax rates. In this section, numerical examples are used to show the implications
of the model for optimal tax rates, growth, and long-run expected social welfare.
The baseline parameter values are shown in table 1. It is important to em-
phasize that the model is highly stylized, hence the examples we present are not
intended to replicate growth rates, research employment, or any other feature
of an actual economy. In general, they concern variables that are diﬃcult or
impossible to measure empirically (the probability of a research success, the
12The numerical simulations show the Taylor series expansion of the welfare function pro-
vides a very good approximation.
15magnitude of the quality improvement, etc.), hence our choices have been arbi-
trary.
Table 1: Baseline parameters
Production technology θ =0 .5 γ =1 .5
Research technology λ =0 .3 η =0 .25
Preferences α =0 .75 δ =0 .25
Population H =2 0 L =4 0
Simulation periods 100
The model is simulated for the baseline parameter values in table 2, while
in each of tables 3 to 6 a single parameter is varied relative to the baseline. The
headings Euu and Eue represent the expected utilities of unskilled and skilled
workers respectively. The term ∆W is the change in the discounted value of
social welfare, relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium. The tables report the
optimal unconstrained and the optimal constrained (i.e. τ0 = τ1)t a xr a t e s .
The eﬀects of introducing small tax rates are also reported in table 2 to il-
lustrate propositions 1 and 2. In the baseline case, the laissez-faire economy
exhibits a moderate research activity in competition periods and a large re-
search sector in monopoly periods, with about 12 and 23 per cent of the skilled
labor force engaged in research, respectively. The growth rate has been annu-
alized, under the assumption that each period–which represents the lifetime
of a research project–corresponds to 7 years. Our example implies an annual
expected growth rate of 2.18 per cent. The expected utility of skilled workers is
64 per cent higher than that of unskilled workers.
We can infer several interesting results from the simulations.
1. Optimal tax rates are high.
The optimal values of τ0 and τ1 lie between 33 and 80 per cent. One reason
for this is that uncertainty generates a substantial utility loss that the social
planner wants to neutralize by providing insurance. This ﬁnding is similar
to Eaton and Rosen’s (1980) demonstration that, even if the fraction of the
population that experiences wage uncertainty is small, optimal tax rates are
high.
2. Growth-promotion is achieved primarily with redistribution in the competi-
tion state (using τ0), while income-equalization is achieved primarily with
redistribution in the monopoly state (using τ1).
16T a b l e2 :B a s e l i n ec a s e
H =2 0
L =4 0
τ1 τ0 R1 R0 gE u u Eue ∆W
0 0 4.63 2.47 2.18 .487 .760 -
.05 0 4.98 2.33 2.18 .489 .761 0.26
0 .05 4.63 2.73 2.20 .490 .754 0.07
.64 .64 6.63 3.27 2.35 .549 .661 2.34
.69 .57 6.79 2.27 2.27 .550 .669 2.50
H =2 5
L =4 0
0 0 5.79 3.09 2.30 .533 .696 -
.05 0 6.22 2.91 2.31 .534 .699 0.28
0 .05 5.79 3.44 2.34 .535 .693 0.06
.61 .61 8.38 4.15 2.51 .573 .651 2.14
.65 53. 8.55 2.97 2.41 .573 .658 2.28
H =1 5
L =4 0
0 0 3.47 1.85 2.03 .434 .851 -
.05 0 3.67 1.75 2.02 .437 .849 0.26
0 .05 3.47 2.03 2.06 .437 .842 0.11
.70 .70 4.93 2.42 2.19 .521 .660 2.94
.73 .63 5.01 1.70 2.09 .521 .674 3.14
Comparing the second and third lines of each panel in table 2, we can see
that the two taxes have diﬀerent eﬀects on innovation and redistribution. τ0 has
as t r o n gg r o w t he ﬀect, as it implies that producers are subsidizing unsuccessful
entrepreneurs, hence providing insurance and encouraging innovation. On the
contrary, τ1 has a large redistributive eﬀect as it taxes the (very rich) patent
holder and redistributes the proceeds, strongly impacting welfare. However, it
reduces the prize obtained by a successful researcher, partially oﬀsetting the
insurance eﬀect on innovation.
To highlight the importance of considering entrepreneurship in a dynamic
context, table 3 shows the equilibrium with no growth (γ = 1); entrepreneurship
is then a purely rent-seeking activity with no social beneﬁt. Comparing these
results with those of table 2 we see that the optimal tax rates are substantially
lower in the absence of technical change. The social planner is only interested
in reducing inequality, and has no reason to want to promote entrepreneurship
as all it does is transfer monopoly proﬁts from one individual to another. It is
particularly striking that the optimal value of τ0 is zero. Since the main role of
τ0 is to provide insurance and encourage research, the social planner minimizes
the loss due to rent-seeking by providing no insurance.
These considerations explain the eﬀects of varying the discount factor in
table 4. With high discounting, δ =0 .1, the social planner cares strongly about
redistribution and chooses a high tax on proﬁts that entails a substantial amount
of redistribution and hence a large increase in welfare. With low discounting,
δ =0 .5, the planner cares strongly about growth, and provides a substantial
amount of insurance (high τ0) in order to promote growth. For an intermediate
value of δ the planner faces a trade-oﬀ between the static redistributive gains
17and the dynamic beneﬁts, and the resulting compromise in tax rates leads to a
small improvement in welfare.
Table 3: No growth case
τ1 τ0 R1 R0 gE u u Eue ∆W
γ =1 0 0 3.34 1.75 0 .437 .685 -
η =0 .25 .58 .58 4.80 2.26 0 .489 .599 1.14
.42 0 4.45 1.00 0 .453 .690 2.35
Table 4: Diﬀerent discount rates
τ1 τ0 R1 R0 gE u u Eue ∆W
δ =0 .1 0 0 4.63 2.47 2.18 .487 .760 -
.56 .56 8.19 4.06 2.49 .570 .656 13.48
.65 .33 8.55 1.90 2.27 .566 .675 14.11
δ =0 .25 0 0 4.63 2.47 2.18 .487 .760 -
.64 .64 6.63 3.27 2.35 .549 .661 2.34
.69 .57 6.79 2.27 2.27 .550 .669 2.50
δ =0 .5 0 0 4.63 2.47 2.18 .487 .760 -
.80 .80 7.23 3.56 2.40 .562 .623 4.56
.77 .85 7.10 5.57 2.54 .554 .615 5.03
Table 5: Degrees of monopoly power
τ1 τ0 R1 R0 gE u u Eue ∆W
θ =0 .4 0 0 6.22 2.84 1.72 .589 .6586 -
.55 .55 8.54 3.66 2.47 .600 .650 1.52
.59 .44 8.68 2.58 2.37 .600 .6589 1.64
θ =0 .5 0 0 4.63 2.47 2.18 .487 .760 -
.64 .64 6.63 3.27 2.35 .549 .661 2.34
.69 .57 6.79 2.27 2.27 .550 .669 2.50
θ =0 .6 0 0 3.34 2.07 2.05 .392 .849 -
.73 .73 4.98 2.84 2.24 .561 .649 3.90
.76 .68 5.08 2.04 2.14 .561 .657 4.06
3. Optimal redistribution can result in a Pareto improvement.
All generations are better oﬀ if redistribution raises the growth rate and
simultaneously increases the steady state expected utilities of skilled and un-
18skilled workers.13 An example of a Pareto-improving optimal redistribution is
shown in table 5 (θ =0 .4), where there is a high degree of monopoly power. In
this case the losses associated with monopoly are large and, consequently, the
optimal tax rates are relatively small. The direct eﬀect on skilled incomes is
modest and oﬀset by the increase in wages, leaving the skilled marginally better
oﬀ, while the unskilled are signiﬁcantly better oﬀ due to the redistribution of
income.
4. Welfare gains can be large.
In our baseline example, welfare gains from optimal taxation are moderate,
between 2.3 and 3.1 per cent. Tables 4 and 5 show that gains can be large, of
up to 14 per cent.
5. Optimal redistribution can be growth-enhancing.
This is the case in all the examples in the tables. The impact of optimal
redistribution on growth depends heavily on the social planner’s discount rate.
In the baseline case (table 2, panel 1, row 5) the eﬀect of redistribution on
growth is moderate, raising the annual growth rate by only 0.09 percentage
points. However, with a high discount rate (e.g., δ =0 .5 in table 4) or a high
degree of monopoly power (e.g., θ =0 .4 in table 6), the eﬀect is much stronger,
increasing the growth rate by 0.4 to 0.6 of a percentage point. On the other
hand, redistribution may also reduce growth, as can be seen in the third panel
of table 2, where the number of skilled workers is small and only a small (non-
optimal) tax rate of τ1 =0 .05 is applied.
6. There is a tradeoﬀ between social welfare and growth, which depends on
the size of the intertemporal spillover.
In almost all the cases shown in the tables, the growth rate is higher when
taxes are constrained to be the same in both states than when they are set at the
unconstrained optimum. The static and dynamic consequences of innovation
have opposite eﬀects on social welfare, hence W is not necessarily increasing in q.
The size of intertemporal spillovers, determined by γ, is crucial for optimizing
this tradeoﬀ. From lemma 1 we know that greater spillovers lead to higher
values of q,w h i c hi nt u r na ﬀect the balance between static and dynamic social
welfare considerations. The dynamic eﬀect of γ is simply that the greater the
spillover, the larger the increase in output following an innovation. Innovation
hence creates a large social surplus and the social planner would tend to use
redistributive taxation to foster research activity. There are two static eﬀects.
13The expectations of workers are taken with respect to aggregate risk; e.g., EUm = qU1
m+
(1 − q)U0
m is the expected utility of producers. Note also that the ﬁrst term in the social
welfare function (26) can be written as the sum of the expected utilities of skilled and unskilled
workers:
qu1 +( 1− q)u0 = H
¡
qu1










19First, a larger γ results in a larger q, hence monopoly states and their consequent
output loss occur more frequently. Second, the larger is γ,t h eh i g h e rRφ and
the lower Mφ are. As a result, the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages is larger,
i.e. inequality is greater.14
Now consider the social welfare function (26). Suppose γ is close to one.
Then the dynamic component of social welfare drops out. Moreover, there is
little incentive to innovate when γ is small, so q will be small. Optimal taxation
will be driven, in this case, mainly by the desire to maximize u0. Since skilled-
unskilled inequality rises with γ, optimal tax rates will be increasing in γ when
the spillover is small. Moreover, when growth is moderate the government will
want to encourage entrepreneurship through redistribution. However, as γ–and
hence q–increase the welfare loss due to monopoly power becomes progressively
larger. The social planner does not want to encourage excessive growth, and
the optimal tax rate eventually falls. The reduction in the tax rate is, however,
partly oﬀset by the fact that a high γ also increases inequality, thus calling for
more redistribution. These considerations suggest our ﬁnal result.
7. Optimal tax rates are hump-shaped functions of the spillover factor.
Figure 2 depicts the constrained optimal tax rates –i.e., τ1 = τ∗ = τ0–as
they relate to γ.A sγ increases the optimal tax rate rises rapidly, attaining its
maximum for γ =1 .5, and then falling slowly because of the trade-oﬀ between
the eﬃciency and equity considerations. Note that the constrained optimal tax
rates always lie between the optimal unconstrained values of τ0 and τ1 in the
tables. The hump-shaped proﬁle depicted in ﬁgure 2 is similar to both of the
optimal unconstrained tax rate proﬁles.







Spillovers and optimal tax rates 
 
 




















 For  5 . 1 1 ≤ < γ , the optimal tax rate stimulates the growth rate relative to the laissez-faire 
equilibrium ; for  5 . 1 > γ , the optimal tax reduces growth. 7 Conclusions
We have examined the eﬀe c to fr e d i s t r i b u t i o ni na nR & D - d r i v e ng r o w t hm o d e l ,
where the occupational choice between production and risky entrepreneurship
determines the rate of innovation and growth. The paper brings together two
strands of literature, the endogenous growth literature and the analysis of tax-
ation and occupational choice, which had not previously been combined. Its
contribution is twofold. On the one hand, we have explicitly examined what
was a neglected implication of the Schumpeterian growth model, that because
redistribution acts as social insurance, it can increase the incentives for individ-
uals to undertake risky R&D. With suﬃcient risk aversion this eﬀect is strong
enough to oﬀset the standard eﬀects of taxation through the reduction of proﬁts
and hence result in a faster growth rate. On the other, we have embedded some
of the existing results of the optimal taxation literature in a general equilib-
rium model. This implies, ﬁrst, that the market incomes of diﬀerent individuals
are endogenous and hence aﬀected by the tax choices. Second, the degree of
uncertainty in the economy becomes endogenous, as the aggregate eﬀect of oc-
cupational choices aﬀects the probability of success of individual entrepreneurs.
This consideration, in combination with the technological spillovers from inno-
vation, generates an externality that is taken into account by the social planner
when choosing the optimal tax rates. We show that optimal tax rates are a
hump-shaped function of the size of the intertemporal spillover from innova-
tion.
An important aspect of our analysis is that we have assumed ﬁnite lives. A
large part of the literature on taxation and growth focuses on inﬁnitely-lived
agents. In this case, policies that increase the growth rate tend to also increase
the welfare of all individuals, since the dynamic eﬀect of faster growth oﬀsets
static losses. Our approach, in contrast, has examined the welfare gains and
losses of short-lived agents, and shown that even in this case general equilib-
rium eﬀects may be powerful enough to oﬀset direct redistributive losses to the
richest individuals and generate a Pareto improvement, raising the welfare of
all individuals.
Our analysis has considered cash redistribution as the only possible policy
that the government can undertake. However, an important and well-known
implication of the type of model we analyze is that R&D subsidies can aﬀect
the growth rate. Such subsidies have, however, been the object of substantial
criticism from economists, because of the scope for diversion of expenditures and
manipulation to which they are subject (Katz and Ordover, 1990). This manip-
ulation can take place at the ﬁrm level, or even at the level of the government
which can use them in order to engage in tax competition with other countries
and attract enterprises. By focussing on redistribution we are not arguing that
R&D subsidies should not be used, rather we have provided a possible alter-
n a t i v ep o l i c yt of o s t e rg r o w t h ,w h i c hc o u l db eu s e dw h e nR & Ds u b s i d i e sa r e
deemed problematic.
We have focused on linear income redistribution, but it is noteworthy that
even lump-sum transfers generally do not produce optimality, when entrepreneur-
22ship is an occupational choice. Even in the simplest models the ﬁrst-best op-
timum requires the coordinated use of several policies, such as occupational
licensing, price controls, and either wage controls or redistribution (Kanbur,
1981). Thus any single policy measure produces at most a second-best op-
timum. Finally, redistributions provided in-kind, such as free schooling and
public health care, may be just as important as cash transfers in reality for an
entrepreneur evaluating the possible consequences of taking risks.
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249A p p e n d i x
9.1 The Long-Run Probability of Innovation
Given the equilibrium number of researchers, the probabilities of innovation in




q1 1 − q1
q0 1 − q0
¶
(A1)
where q1 ≡ λ
¡
R1¢η and q0 ≡ λ
¡
R0¢η are the probabilities of innovation in
the current period when the current state is φ =1a n dφ = 0, respectively.
Similarly, 1 − q1 and 1 − q0 are the probabilities of no innovation given the
current state.
Given an initial state at time 0, φ0 ∈ {1,0}, the probability of an innovation







where Q(t) ≡ Q × Q × ... × Q (t times). For instance, if φ0 = 1, then the
probability of an innovation occurring in period 2 is q1(2) = (q1)2 +( 1−q1)q0,
while if φ0 =0 ,t h e nq0(2) = q0q1 +( 1− q0)q0.
It is well known that as t increases the importance of the initial state φ0 in
determining the future probabilities vanishes; that is, in the limit q1(t)=q0(t).
Letting q denote this steady state probability of innovation, the solution for q
(see, e.g., Feller, 1968) is
q =
q0
1 − q1 + q0, (A3)
1 − q =
1 − q1
1 − q1 + q0. (A4)
Thus in the long run the state-dependent Markov process converges to an
invariant probability distribution, generating a simple Bernouilli process for
innovation, in which at any future period t there is a chance q that an innovation
occurs, regardless of the initial state φ0.
9.2 Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . From the equilibrium equation (17) it is immediately
s e e nt h a tt h ei n t r o d u c t i o no fat a xτ0 does not aﬀect research in the monopoly






evaluating the derivative at τ0 = 0, yields dR0
dτ0 = ∞. Hence, the introduction of
at a xτ0 increases R0 and the probability of innovation in the competition state
25q0. Recall that the growth rate is given by g = q lnγ, where q is increasing in
q0.T h e ndg/dτ0 > 0.







































T h et e r m1 /(τ1)1−α on the RHS of (A5) approaches inﬁnity as τ1goes to
zero, while all other terms are ﬁnite; therefore, dR1/dτ1 = ∞ at τ1 =0 .
The eﬀect of τ1on R0 is more complicated as R0 depends on R1 as well as







































































γαλ(1 − θ)α. (A8)



















26In the limit, as τ1 approaches zero, dR1/dτ1 approaches inﬁnity, and there-
fore, dR0/dτ1 = −∞ in (27).
The growth rate is given by g = q lnγ. Recall that q = q0/
¡
1 − q1 + q0¢
,
implying that the tax has opposing eﬀects on the two probabilities of innovation.













/(1 − q1 + q0)2. (A10)
The sign of dq/dτ1 depends on the sign of the term in brackets. Substituting
for dR0/dτ1 using (A9), and for dR1/dτ1 using (A5), and rearranging terms,
shows that dq/dτ1 > 0 if and only if
q1







This expression can be shown to be satisﬁed for H suﬃciently large. On the
right-hand side of (A11), the minimum value of the denominator equals 1 − η.
Now consider its numerator. From (19), write the solution for R1 implicitly as,
R1 + ψ(R1)(1−η)/α = H,
where ψ =( 1 /γλ











implying that 0 <d R 1/dH < 1. Therefore as H rises, R1 does not rise by as
much. Thus H/R1 must rise with H and the right-hand side of (A11) goes to
zero. The the left-hand side of (A11) is increasing in H ,a sd(q1/(1−q1))/dq1 >
0, dq1/dR1 > 0, and dR1/dH > 0 . Hence, for H suﬃciently large, (A11) is
satisﬁed. The reasoning above is for an interior solution (q<1). If, instead, a
corner solution is reached, then (A11) is satisﬁed trivially.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . For the eﬀect of taxes on equilibrium wages, totally
diﬀerentiate (4)—(8) with respect to τ0 and τ1, using (2) and (1) to substitute
for Y φ in terms of Mφ = H −Rφ. The signs of the wage derivatives then follow
immediately by applying proposition 1 to dRφ/dτ0 and dRφ/dτ1.
For the eﬀect of taxes on the equilibrium utilities of skilled workers, totally






















































Using proposition 1 for the signs of dRφ/dτ1 and dRφ/dτ0 determines the signs
of the utility derivatives. A similar calculation is applied to the utility of un-
skilled workers, equation (14), to complete the proof.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . We calculate social welfare from the long-run proba-
bilities of innovation. The probability that the initial state is φ0 =1c a nb e
any value 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, but let a = q.T h u s t h e ﬁrst term in the social welfare
function is qu1+(1−q)u0. The second part of the formula for the social welfare
function is obtained by induction from the Bernouilli process with probability









Moreover, the maximum value of the probability term qs(1 − q)t−s is (1/2)t,
while γs ·
su1+(t−s)u0







which is ﬁnite for δ < γ.
Proof of Lemma 3. A second-order approximation can be used to abtain an
approximate social welfare function. Denote by f(s,t)t h eﬂow of beneﬁts for a
given time period t,w h e r e
f(s,t)=γs
·




T h es o c i a lw e l f a r ec a nt h e nb ew r i t t e na s ,





28where E (·) is the expectation operator under the binomial distribution for a
given t.N o wf o rag i v e nt, take a second-order Taylor series approximation of
f(s,t) around the expected value of s, E(s)=tq,
f(s,t) ≈ f(tq,t)+f0(tq,t)(s − tq)+( 1 /2)f00(tq,t)(s − tq)2 (A17)
where f0 and f00 are the ﬁrst and second derivatives of f with respect to s.
Evaluating E(f(s,t)) then gives
E(f(s,t)) = f(tq,t)+( 1 /2)f00(tq,t)Va r(s) (A18)
where Va r(s)=tq(1 − q) is the variance of s under the binomial distribution,
and
f(tq,t)=γtq £
qu1 +( 1− q)u0¤
(A19)
is the period-t ﬂow of beneﬁts evaluated at the average number of innovations


















su1 +( t − s)u0
¶
f0(s,t). (A22)














Combining terms and evaluating f00(s,t)a ts = tq results in the expression,
f00(s,t)=−γtq £
qu1 +( 1− q)u0¤µ
u1 − u0








tqu1 +( t − tq)u0¢
tqu1 +( t − tq)u0 +
u1 − u0











The approximation to social welfare using the Taylor series expansion for
f(s,t)i st h e ng i v e nb y ,




tE [f(tq,t)+( 1 /2)f00(tq,t)Va r(s)]. (A26)
29After substituting for f(tq,t)a n df00(tq,t) using (A19) and (A25), the expression
(A26) can be expanded as,


















which can be written as,




qu1 +( 1− q)u0¢
(A28)

















qu1 +( 1− q)u0¢
(A29)











Using the reduced forms of the inﬁnite sums, the expression for social welfare
simpliﬁes to the expression given in the lemma.
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